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INTERNATIONAL LAW: REACTIONS TO 
WITHDRAWING FROM INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM 
CHRISTIANA OCHOA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Withdrawing from International Custom,1 a recent article by Curtis 
Bradley and Mitu Gulati, has sparked interest and debate. Bradley and 
Gulati’s article develops with significant nuance and detail a proposal that, 
naturally, can be best understood by a careful reading of their work. In 
essence, it proposes a modification in customary international law (“CIL”) 
doctrine—a change that would permit states to unilaterally exit from 
existing CIL. 
This Essay will act as a brief reflection on that article. In creating their 
argument for the right of states to unilaterally exit CIL, the limitations on 
such a right and the duties of parties seeking to exit, Withdrawing turns to 
three areas of social life in which the rules for entry and exit are ordered 
and at least partially doctrinally set: contracts, political representation and 
constitutions. This Essay will provide a brief response to the analogy 
Withdrawing makes to each of these three areas. Ultimately, it argues that 
Gulati and Bradley have not adequately considered aspects of these three 
means of social ordering. If they had, they would find that i) unilateral exit 
from contract is a breach of the exiting party’s obligations, ii) political 
representation argues in favor of the existing system and iii) that there is a 
strong presumption in constitutions—just as there is in treaties, legislation 
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 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 
(2010) [hereinafter Withdrawing]. 
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and contract—in favor of symmetry between how parties become bound by 
law and how they become unbound by that same law. 
In Part I, this Essay will explore the analogies Withdrawing makes 
between CIL and contract and will argue, first that the analogy 
Withdrawing makes between CIL and contract is lacking and, second, that 
even to the extent that contract demonstrates how other doctrinal areas 
order exits from legal relationships, contract illustrates the point that 
unilateral exit is a recognized abdication of the exiting party’s obligations 
and that unilateral exit gives rise to legal liability. In Part II, it explores the 
analogies Withdrawing makes between governments and agents in order to 
i) unpack some of the political theory constructs on which Withdrawing 
relies, and ii) explore the limitations Withdrawing sets on the proposal for 
unilateral exit. Part III of this Essay makes an affirmative argument for 
symmetry between CIL formation doctrine and CIL disintegration doctrine. 
The current proposal anticipates that CIL formation would remain 
unchanged, but exit for any given state would be far more expeditious than 
is contemplated by current CIL exit formulations. This Part will argue that 
this proposal violates a strong presumption in favor of symmetrical 
entrenchment.2 
I. SOCIAL CONTRACT, NOT CONTRACT 
In developing the proposal for unilateral exit from CIL, Withdrawing 
often relies on analogies to contract doctrine, never stating explicitly how 
this analogy is functional, nor how it fails. It is important to recognize that 
an analogy between CIL and contract is far from perfect, especially in the 
context of a proposal for unilateral exit from CIL. CIL is more akin to a 
social contract than it is to a private contract between parties. It is sensible 
to analogize treaties to contracts in some contexts and to constitutions in 
other contexts. Treaties, especially commercial, bilateral treaties, bear 
notable similarity to contracts. However, for reasons that should be obvious 
to most readers, CIL bears significant differences from treaties, both at the 
formation stage and, at least in most cases, in the means for departure.3 
These differences matter, even when CIL and treaty cover similar subject 
areas. Bradley and Gulati attempt to point to the substantive overlap 
between CIL and treaty in order to claim that the two are therefore the 
 
 2. The theory of symmetrical entrenchment is presented in John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 386 
(2003). 
 3. In contrast to CIL formation, treaty obligations are formed after they are negotiated—and 
explicitly stated in written form. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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same, or at least that they can be thought of as the same for purposes of exit 
mechanisms. But it simply does not follow that if contract is sometimes 
like treaty (a relatively unobjectionable claim) and treaty is sometimes like 
CIL (another relatively unobjectionable claim), that contract is therefore 
like CIL. 
To the extent that CIL binds parties to one another and we feel a need 
to think about that relationship in contractual terms, Rousseau is quite 
helpful. By participating in CIL formation, each state places itself and its 
otherwise free exercise of sovereign will under the direction of the 
collective will. Once CIL has formed on a particular norm, it binds each 
state that has not objected to its creation. It binds states to comply with the 
norm, and it also binds each state to its counterparts, who have legitimate 
grounds to expect compliance with the norm. Each state becomes an 
indivisible part of the body of states that are bound to the particular norm 
and, through it, to one another.4 In place of each state, “this act of 
association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many 
members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this 
same act its unity, its common self, its life and will.”5 CIL is formed 
willfully, through the collective acts and beliefs of states. Those collective 
acts and beliefs result in each state agreeing to constrain its future behavior 
to reflect the common will. CIL is thus much like a first order social 
contract. This is quite different from a transactional contract and it is also 
very different from treaty. We should thus expect that the terms of exit 
would be quite different as well. 
Contract is a troublesome analogy for other reasons as well. For 
example, to the extent Withdrawing analogizes to contract, it does so by 
making reference to contract-formation, rather than to contract exit.6 It does 
this without making any argument for why contract formation is relevant to 
CIL exit. Students of contract know that how a contract is formed is 
 
 4. This phrasing generously borrows from JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 24 (Donald A. Cress, ed. trans., 1983) (1762). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Withdrawing , supra note 1, at 248-49 (discussing the formation of sovereign debt 
contracts). It also refers to a phenomenon in contract known as penalty default, in which a term is 
“purposefully set at what the parties would not want.” Id. at 268 (quoting Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 
(1989)). Gulati and Bradley use the concept of penalty default to deflect arguments for using treaties to 
override CIL that has become outdated or undesirable without recognizing that, unlike in the penalty 
default context, CIL only arises because the parties – at least at one time – seem to have actually wanted 
and behaved in accordance with the underlying norm. 
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doctrinally distinct from the consequences of its dissolution.7 If we are to 
analogize to contract at all, it ought to be with respect to exit, not 
formation. 
Still, there is more to say about contracts. Like CIL, contracts bring 
parties into relationship with one another. More importantly given the 
proposal at hand, which contemplates the dissolution of legal relationships, 
contract doctrine also contains useful tools for understanding what courts 
have viewed as the reasonable means to dissolve complex, arms-length 
relationships. Thus, discussion of some key aspects of contract exit 
doctrine may be useful in thinking about CIL disintegration. Especially if 
CIL is to be equated to contract, then a proposal that contemplates the 
terms of exit from CIL ought to be concerned with the rules for exit from 
contract—in particular, the rules of breach, non-performance and 
repudiation. 
Even to the extent the CIL-to-contract analogy fails, these components 
of contract law may be useful because of what they say about our 
experience with respect to fair outcomes when reasonable, legally 
enforceable expectations are disappointed. Also, both CIL and contract 
anticipate that the commitments governing the parties may not always be 
desirable, and may thus require departure. Contract law has long grappled 
with these concepts in a relatively simplified, economic, typically bilateral 
context. For these reasons, it may help shine light on what is reasonable to 
expect from exiting parties in the area of contracts. 
Unilateral departure from legal obligations agreed between the parties 
is called breach.8 Breach results in a number of legal consequences for the 
parties to the contract, from the right of the non-breaching party to be 
compensated by the breaching party (in the event of partial breach) to 
damages coupled with termination of the relationship between the parties 
(in the event of total breach). Parties may breach a contract by a number of 
methods, including performance that is inconsistent with the terms of the 
contract, non-performance and anticipatory repudiation.9 
A partial breach coupled with the declared intention to exit the 
contractual relationship results in total breach.10 The proposal asserted in 
Withdrawing contemplates that states would give notice of their intention 
to exit from existing CIL and that such notice would be given before the 
 
 7. Contract formation is covered under doctrines governing, for example, offer, acceptance and 
consideration, while contract dissolution is covered under doctrines regarding, for example, breach, 
repudiation, avoidance, and remedies. 
 8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (9th ed. 2009). 
 9. See id. at 1418. 
 10. See id. at 213. 
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given state’s actions began to deviate from CIL.11 This type of ex ante 
declaration of an intention to deviate from the state’s promised behavior 
bears the most similarity to the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation, under 
which a party repudiates its contractual duties before the time for 
performance arrives.12 Before exploring the analytical utility of anticipatory 
repudiation,13 it may be worthwhile to explore a simpler concept in 
governing contract-based relationships. 
A common conceptual leap for all students of contract law is that 
breach is not necessarily normatively bad. Contract doctrine leaves open 
the possibility of an efficient breach, which contemplates the situation in 
which unilateral exit from the contractual relationship is beneficial to the 
breaching party, even after all parties with legitimate expectations under 
the contract are properly compensated. It is important to note, of course, 
that a breach is only called efficient (and thus normatively neutral or 
positive) in the event that efficiency can be achieved even after the 
breaching party has internalized damages incurred by its contracting 
counter-parties, with those damages reflecting the costs to the injured party, 
as that injured party experiences them.14 The key point is that “the result of 
nonperformance is economically efficient only if the value of the gain to 
the [breaching] party is greater than the value of the loss to the other 
party.”15 
The same might be said of departures from CIL. A state’s intentional 
CIL violation can be seen as efficient when the value of the gain to the 
exiting state is greater than the value of the loss to non-violating states. One 
should expect that this is exactly how CIL would change over time. As 
states realize that their behavior has become inefficient and decide to 
absorb the costs of their violations, a particular norm would either change 
or disintegrate entirely. CIL, like contract, anticipates that relationships 
change through time, as parties’ values, interests and goals change. Thus, 
 
 11. See Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 258-59. Presumably, a state’s performative departures 
before giving due notice would indisputably be violations of CIL. 
 12. See ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.20 (3d ed. 2004). 
 13. See generally Palmer v. Fox, 274 Mich. 252 (Mich. 1936) (stating that a repudiation together 
with a breach by non-performance has the effect of giving a claim for total breach to the injured party); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243(1) (1981). When non-performance is 
accompanied or followed by repudiation, this is called a total breach. Id. §243(2). 
 14. These subjective preferences of the non-breaching party have to govern the assessment of 
damages in the efficient breach situation in order to account for the likely possibility that the breaching 
party and the non-breaching party will value the breach differently. This is the Kaldor or the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, §12.3 (citing Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions 
of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J. R. Hicks, The 
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939)). 
 15. Id. 
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CIL also implicitly contemplates efficient violations of the law. If it were 
otherwise, CIL would be unidirectional and could never change. 
Breach of contract discussions are most squarely related to 
Withdrawing in the context of anticipatory repudiation, since, like in the 
proposal stated in Withdrawing, the would-be departing party declares its 
intention to depart from its binding obligations prior to actual departure. 
For this reason, it is worth considering the consequences of contractual 
anticipatory repudiation. 
Anticipatory repudiation on the part of one contracting party “gives 
rise to a claim for damages for total breach.”16 This may be true even when 
the repudiation “is not accompanied or preceded by a breach by non-
performance.”17 In other words, the anticipation of failed expectations may 
itself give rise to a claim for damages. Parties may engage in anticipatory 
repudiation for a number of reasons, including the type of changed 
conditions that would recommend efficient breach. Regardless of the 
reasons for the anticipatory repudiation, it may be treated as a breach 
giving rise to damage claims.18 
There are significant and important differences between departures 
from contract and departures from CIL that merit consideration. Unlike in 
contract, CIL deviations are likely to impact many parties negatively by 
disappointing the expectations that form the basis of the CIL norm, 
decreasing the likelihood that a deviation can be efficient. This clearly 
makes CIL more “sticky” than contract and Part III will discuss why this is 
normatively desirable and consistent with the theory of symmetrical 
entrenchment. 
Additionally, deviations in contract can result in the end of the 
relationship between the parties.19 This is clearly not true in CIL, where 
violations, even of the gravest magnitude, can only change the relationship 
between states, but can never truly end them. The result is that in addition 
to whatever compensation is made to non-violating parties, it is equally 
 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(1) (1981); see also Fox v. Dehn, 42 Cal. App. 
3d 165, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that repudiation following partial breach by non-performance 
is to be treated as a total breach and not as an anticipatory breach). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(1), Comment a (1981). 
 18. See id. § 250-51; see also Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
changed circumstances in a sale of goods contract still give rise to damage claims for anticipatory 
repudiation. This was held even as the obligor had died, but his estate was incapable of fulfilling the 
contractual obligations). 
 19. See Plante v. Jacobs, 103 N.W. 2d 296, 298–99 (Wis. 1960) (holding that material deviations 
from specifications and plans agreed to in a contract result in damage claims as established by the 
diminished value rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §235(2), Comment b (1981). 
OCHOA_FMT4.DOC 1/7/2011  1:43:27 PM 
2010] DISINTEGRATING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 
important that the violating state, with rare exception, be maintained, 
resuscitated and re-integrated into the community of non-violating states. 
Finally, in contract context, deviations may result in total breach and 
act to free all parties from their obligations. Rather, all parties, including 
the deviating state, remain bound by the norm. In the CIL context, 
however, deviations are violations of law and will continue to be violations 
of law until enough states deviate from the particular norm with sufficient 
regularity that the norm disintegrates. Again, Part III will argue the value in 
this state of affairs. 
II. REPRESENTATION IS MORE THAN AGENCY 
In the section of Withdrawing dedicated to the affirmative case for 
restricting states’ ability to unilaterally exit CIL, Gulati and Bradley have 
included a section on “Agency Problems.”20 This Part will first discuss why 
employing the terminology of agency is troublesome and will go on to 
explain why the space which Gulati and Bradley allocate to “Agency 
Problems” is impractically narrow. 
As an initial matter, the use of the agency moniker reveals either the 
limited attention Gulati and Bradley have devoted to the function of states 
on the international plane and the source of state legitimacy to make 
international law, or it reveals their fatalistic cynicism about the possibility 
of democratic representation—let alone participation—on the international 
plane. The section on Agency Problems21 is quite short, but its brevity does 
not keep it from displaying internal contradictions with respect to whether 
Gulati and Bradley view states as the delegates of their citizens on the 
international plane, and thus required to represent their citizens’ interests,22 
or whether states are more like trustees, 23 free to do what they believe to be 
the best course, making “even bad decisions across a wide array of issue 
areas,”24 independent from what their citizens might actually desire. 
This internal inconsistency is confusing, not so much because it is 
necessary, possible, or even desirable that the authors pick one mode of 
representation to stand behind, but because they appear to believe that 
states are delegates at one moment and identify states as entities apart and 
autonomous from their citizens in the next moment. This vacillation 
happens without an articulation of these alternate theories of how states’ 
 
 20. See Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 266. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The use of the term Agency would imply this view of representation. 
 23. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1656 (9th ed. 2009). 
 24. Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 267. 
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role in CIL formation (and disintegration) can be mutually accommodating, 
nor how each theory might affect their proposal. For this reason, it is 
important to at least briefly discuss the role of states in international law-
making,25 especially because it reflects one of the classical questions of 
political theory—whether a representative of a particular constituency is 
bound to represent this constituency, or is free to act as she/he/it believes is 
best for the nation.26 
Governments act as legislators for and representatives of their people 
when they make international law. This is more easily perceived in the 
treaty context, but it is also true in the CIL context. The proposal advanced 
in Withdrawing embraces this view of states as legislators, able to exit CIL 
and change the law applicable to a particular state by way of simple 
proclamation.27 
Those who have thought about the role of legislators have long 
recognized the principal-agent relationship is not a useful description of the 
legislator-citizen relationship.28 There are a number of reasons the 
principal-agent analogy is not apt and, at best, only describes some features 
of political representation. For example, in the principal-agent relationship, 
the agent acts as the principal’s direct representative, acting on the 
principal’s directives and can be recalled on the principal’s demand. At 
least in the case of democratic states, this may appear an apt 
characterization of the state-citizen relationship. However, agents are 
typically legally answerable to their principals, especially in the event that 
the agent fails to execute the principal’s instructions. This characteristic is 
untenable, even in democratic states, for at least two reasons. First, in every 
state system, there will be many citizens and citizens’ groups, each with 
very different desires and demands of their representatives. The 
representative simply cannot execute the orders of each principal—or even 
the demands of amassed principals—in good faith, due to the fact of 
political diversity. Rather, the representative will regularly attend to some 
of its citizens and contradict the desires and demands of others. Hanna 
Pitkin, a leading political theorist on this issue notes with great clarity: 
In the first place, the political representative has a constituency and 
constituents, not a principal . . . In the second place, he is a 
professional politician in a framework of political institutions . . . . He 
 
 25. A full discussion of this topic is most certainly outside of the scope of this Essay, but surely a 
topic worth further consideration. 
 26. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 215 (1967). 
 27. See Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 207. 
 28. The authoritative work on this subject is PITKIN, supra note 26. 
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must be sensitive to his political party . . . and to various public and 
private groups and interests . . . In the third place, he will also have 
views and opinions, at least on some issues . . . . And issues do not 
come before him in isolation; issues are interrelated . . . . Thus in 
legislative behavior a great complexity and plurality of determinants 
are at work . . . .29 
Second, the idea that representatives would bear legal (rather than 
merely political) accountability to their citizens for their international 
legislative acts is unlikely, due to the traditional protections of sovereign 
authority provided state actors.30 These differences result in Pitkin’s 
conclusion that “[n]one of the analogies of acting for others on the 
individual level seems satisfactory for explaining the relationship between 
a political representative and his constituents. He is neither agent nor 
trustee nor deputy nor commissioner . . . .”31 Rather, representation happens 
holistically—through the complexity of a functioning political system, 
which includes multiple actors acting in multiple capacities over time.32 
The key is that representation happens only “if the people (or a 
constituency) are present in governmental action . . .”33 and when 
representatives are at least “potentially responsive” to their citizens.34 
It is unclear whether Gulati and Bradley believe states ought to be at 
least potentially responsive to their citizens.35 What is clear is that they 
believe that in at least some substantive areas, governments are free to revel 
in claims of sovereign authority, exiting from CIL irrespective of their 
citizens’ directives.36 Still, they concede that that there are areas of 
substantive international law in which governments’ interests may 
predictably diverge from those of their citizens.37 They cite to human rights 
as the example of this38 but offer no solid basis for why human rights fit 
that category, while international environmental law or the law on weapons 
of mass destruction or any number of basic commercial law agreements 
might not similarly fit this description. One does not require particular 
 
 29. Id. at 219–20. 
 30. See, e.g., Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 267 n.263 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 12, n.* (1995)). 
 31. PITKIN, supra note 26, at 221. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 222. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 267 n.263 
 36. Id. at 266-67 
 37. Id. at 267. 
 38. Id. See also Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119 (2007). 
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creativity to imagine that states’ interests may diverge from their citizens’ 
interests in some facets within each of these categories. Given this, we can 
start to see that their attempt to limit a state’s right to unilateral exit in the 
area of human rights, but not in other areas sounds rational but is 
impractical. Rather, it is a limitation that blows open the proposal, exposing 
its unpredictable borders. 
They state that the limitation they identify on the right to unilateral 
exit is “by its own terms limited to international law that is focused on 
certain fundamental rights of individuals (such as jus cogens norms),”39 but 
it is unclear why this would be the case. Why limit unilateral exit for 
matters of slavery and piracy (which are generally agreed to be jus cogens 
norms) but not for child labor, which is laden with strong moral 
considerations?40 It is not because moral considerations fall outside of 
Gulati and Bradley’s contemplation. In fact, they make a clear concession 
to strong moral considerations. But this further exacerbates the fuzziness of 
the boundaries on their proposal and demonstrates the lack of clarity and 
predictability that would result from its realization. 
In trying to define the borders of this limitation they write that 
governments should not be able to unilaterally exit when “we can be 
confident, ex ante, that the interests of governments and populations will 
diverge, and where the moral considerations are so strong that they 
override the usual deference to national governments.”41 Under these 
criteria, we would not allow states to exit from international prohibitions 
with respect to slavery or child labor (in which moral considerations are 
high) but we may allow them to exit, for example, from prohibitions on 
piracy (where moral considerations are less strong), despite prohibitions on 
piracy being generally accepted as jus cogens norms. 
Presumably Gulati and Bradley’s desire to limit the right to unilateral 
exit is premised on personal discomfort with the relationship of 
 
 39. Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 267. 
 40. Further, we must recognize that it is not always clear, ex ante, what is and is not a jus cogens 
norm. Take for example, the norm against imposing a death sentence on minors. The case of Michael 
Domingues v. United States provides an example of an international body's opinion that a particular 
norm is of a jus cogens nature. See Michael Domingues v. U.S., Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 62/02 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.12285.htm. 
Michael Domingues had been convicted and sentenced to death in Nevada for two murders committed 
when he was 16 years old. Id. ¶1. When Domingues petitioned the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, the United States argued that there was no jus cogens norm that establishing eighteen as 
the minimum age for the death penalty. The Commission disagreed, concluding that there is a "jus 
cogens norm not to impose capital punishment on individuals who committed their crimes when they 
had not yet reached 18 years of age." Id. ¶85. 
 41. See Withdrawing, supra note 1, at 267. 
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governments to their people in their role as representatives of their 
populations when making international law. This discomfort is legitimate, 
given the complexity of representation, which extends far beyond agency, 
and is quite clearly not an agency relationship in matters of human rights. 
Gulati and Bradley want to concede a limitation when the state is acting for 
itself, rather than on behalf of its people, but only in some areas of the law. 
How we are to know where this limitation to their proposal would apply is 
unclear. The only thing that is clear ex ante is that Withdrawing’s proposal 
would introduce confusion and a lack of predictability that is undesirable 
and contrary to the consistency and predictability of process we expect 
from legitimate systems of law. 
Further, what if the citizenry of a given state can theoretically be 
shown to have deliberated and mandated that their state should exit from 
norms against piracy or slavery or child labor? Perhaps Gulati and Bradley 
would then argue that we should allow unilateral exit? But their proposal 
stops short of this, rather controversial, suggestion. Perhaps this is logical 
even though, on initial pass, one might be tempted to endorse unilateral exit 
when there is a demonstrable national mandate for it. This proposal may 
appear somewhat appealing when standing within the borders of and 
contemplating a “good” democratic state existing in isolation. In this 
instance unilateral exit strikes us as responsive to the interests of that 
particular state’s people. However, this is clearly problematic for the 
international legal order. 
The principle of sovereign equality mandates that all states are equal 
on the international plane. If democratic governments can unilaterally exit 
from CIL, what about dictatorial governments? Would their right to exit 
unilaterally be more restricted than democratic governments? We are surely 
more troubled by the ability of dictatorial governments to decide, in 
relatively short periods of time and with very few checks on their actions to 
unilaterally exit from CIL. Imagine, for example, a once democratic state 
that suffers a coup and very soon thereafter violates multiple CIL norms. 
Under current CIL exit-doctrine, that state would be in flagrante delicto. 
Under the proposal made in Withdrawing, that state would be acting 
legitimately, provided that it fulfilled the minimal requirement of giving 
notice of unilateral exit prior to engaging in CIL violations. 
III. SYMMETRIC ENTRENCHMENT 
This Part will make the argument that the process by which law is 
unmade should bear significant similarity to how law is made. Essentially, 
it argues for symmetrical entrenchment of CIL.  
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The argument that states should be able to withdraw unilaterally from 
custom on prior notice is premised, among other things, on the sense that if 
states can bind themselves to CIL, one by one, by comporting themselves 
in accordance with a forming norm, then they should be able to unbind 
themselves, one by one, in similar fashion. But this is both a 
misrepresentation of how CIL binds states and insensible to basic 
expectations about how law is and should be unmade.42 
This argument will proceed as follows. First, this section will first 
describe how it is that states become bound by CIL, in order to be clear 
about why Withdrawing’s proposal presents asymmetrical entrenchment 
concerns. It will then go on to discuss the concept of symmetrical 
entrenchment and illustrate its presence in other areas of law-making. 
CIL is formed when a sufficient number of states behave in a 
particular way with sufficient consistency for a sufficient amount of time 
out of a sense of legal obligation.43 When this occurs, every non-objecting 
state will be bound by the law, even those that merely acquiesce. States 
generally have time to see custom forming around them, and have the 
opportunity to object so as to either i) preserve a strong argument that CIL 
has not formed around a particular norm or ii) be exempt from the 
application of a particular norm under the persistent objector doctrine.44 
There are many arguments over how many states are required to create 
custom.45 Nowhere, however, do these arguments advance that it takes just 
one state. There are similarly arguments over what counts as state 
practice.46 Nowhere do these debates suggest that a single state can 
unilaterally become legally bound to a forming custom as a matter of CIL 
by way of making a single declaration. What is key is that no one argues 
that just one state can unilaterally make CIL. A single state can, of course, 
decide and declare today that a non-binding norm will henceforth bind 
them and that they believe that norm to have become CIL. But this, without 
more, will not make the norm CIL until a sufficient number of other states 
 
 42. A real strength of Withdrawing is the attention it might draw to the interesting issue of 
unmaking law, which has been understudied. For a fairly recent article about the unmaking of U.S. 
common law, see, for example, Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the 
Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2004); JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW (2005). 
 43. See Maneley O. Hudson, Working Paper on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law 
Commission, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N. 24, 26 (1950). 
 44. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 n.49 (7th ed. 2008) (citing 
Michael Akehust, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L LAW 1 (1974-1975)). 
 45. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. / F.R.G. v. Neth), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 72 (Feb 
20). 
 46. See ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 131–42 (1987) 
(summarizing the debate regarding what behavior counts as state practice). 
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have done the same with sufficient consistency for a sufficient period of 
time. Simply put, a single state cannot unilaterally bind itself to a norm as a 
matter of CIL.47 
Under the existing CIL doctrine, a single state also cannot unilaterally 
un-bind itself. Rather, it must wait for the same process that initially bound 
it to take place again. A sufficient number of states must challenge CIL 
with sufficient consistency for a sufficient period of time such that the 
norm disintegrates. Until that time, a violation of the norm is a violation of 
the law. This consistency between the process and effort required to make 
and disintegrate CIL has been referred to, in other areas, as symmetric 
entrenchment.48 
The idea that a law should be similarly burdensome to make and to 
unmake has aesthetic appeal and seems intuitively correct, though very 
little has been written to theorize this idea. The strongest articulation of this 
theory comes from John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who have 
developed it in order to argue against asymmetric entrenchment of United 
States domestic legislation.49 Many of the arguments they make in 
developing a theory of symmetric entrenchment for domestic legislation 
apply equally to the question at hand. 
McGinnis and Rappaport demonstrate that constitutional 
entrenchments are ordinarily symmetrical because their enactment and 
repeal both occur under the rules of Article V of the Constitution. 
Like all Constitutional amendments, the Eighteenth Amendment was 
entrenched, in that it could only be repealed by satisfying the two strict 
super-majority rules necessary to amend the Constitution. Yet, the 
entrenchment was symmetric, since . . . [it] was enacted through the 
exact same procedures that were necessary to repeal it.50 
The United States Constitution is not the only example of a 
constitutional presumption in favor of symmetric entrenchment.51 
 
 47. The one hypothetical exception to this statement would be in the case of a state that had 
persistently objected to the formation of a norm that has become CIL. Under persistent objector 
doctrine, that state would, without a declaration to the contrary, be unbound by the norm. Perhaps, that 
state could unilaterally become bound by way of a single declaration to that effect. It should be noted, 
however, that this is not the same as a state deciding to unilaterally exit because signing up to 
established custom is a unilateral decision to join the community of states whereas exiting established 
custom is a unilateral decision to go rogue. 
 48. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 2. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 417. 
 51. An interesting research question beyond the scope of this paper would be an empirical enquiry 
into the unmaking of constitutional provisions or whole constitutions. Intuition and brief survey 
suggests that the symmetric entrenchment theory holds in most countries. 
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Particularly interesting to this discussion, are perhaps those countries 
operating under systems of asymmetric federalism. Such systems, in some 
respects, accommodate the possibility that a particular territory within a 
federation may want to exit or be exempt from particular constitutional 
rules—a roughly analogous condition to one particular state hoping for exit 
from CIL. Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria and the former Yugoslavia 
employ aspects of asymmetric federalism, allowing municipalities or 
components of the federation a certain degree of legislative and/or 
constitutional autonomy from the federation.52 In all of these examples, the 
possibility of exit or exemption from particular federal constitutional 
provisions was either negotiated at the time the constitution was formed, 
obviating the question of entrenchment from the outset (Yugoslavia is an 
example here)53 or required the consent of the whole federation and looked 
like symmetrical (or at least similar) entrenchment.54 None of the examples 
of asymmetric federalism support asymmetric entrenchment in the form of 
unilateral exit from existing norms. 
McGinnis and Rappaport also present extended evidence and 
argument about symmetric entrenchment in the legislative process, arguing 
that legislation is improved when the process of making and unmaking 
legislation is symmetrical,55 leading them to the position that “the central 
normative consideration governing entrenchment . . . is the presumption of 
symmetry.”56 
If this Essay failed to convince readers that contract is not a fit 
analogue for CIL and readers still adhere to the logic that CIL is like treaty 
and treaty is like contract, therefore CIL must be like contract, then it may 
now be worth considering that contract law also embeds the theory of 
symmetrical entrenchment. One party acting alone cannot create 
contractual obligations. Thus, if one party unilaterally exits the contract, the 
exit is a violation of the contract—a breach—and it will give rise to 
obligations to remedy the breach. Only in the case of mutual rescission can 
parties to a bilateral contract surrender their rights and duties under the 
 
 52. See SERGIO ORTINO, MITJA ŽAGAR & VOJTECH MASTNY, THE CHANGING FACES OF 
FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONAL RECONFIGURATION IN EUROPE FROM EAST TO WEST 123-27; 140-41; 179 
n.62 (citing Arthur Benz, From Unitary to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock after 50 
Years, 29 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, no. 4, 1999 at 56, 193-95, 200 n.42 (2005)). 
 53. Id. at 123-27. 
 54. Id. at 193-95. 
 55. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 2, at 419-26. 
 56. Id. at 418. 
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contract without breaching the contract.57 Mutuality is required in making 
the contract and mutuality is required for exiting without violating the 
contract. 
Treaties also reflect a strong tendency toward symmetric 
entrenchment. Gulati and Bradley make much of the fact that treaties often 
allow states to unilaterally exit their treaty commitments and argue that if 
states can do that in the treaty context, they should be able to do so in the 
CIL context.58 This is an interesting argument but it is unpersuasive. It 
attempts to make treaties and CIL the same by pointing to the fact that 
treaties and CIL often cover substantively similar areas of law. They then 
argue that this similarity dictates that exit rules for treaties and CIL should 
be the same. The argument fails, however, because it does not to take 
account of the strong presumption in favor of symmetrical entrenchment. In 
other words, it fails to recognize that treaties and CIL are different because 
their formation process is different. The means by which they become 
entrenched is different. States unilaterally declare their intention to become 
bound by a treaty and, so, with few exceptions, they can declare their 
intention to become unbound. This means most treaties are consistent with 
symmetrical entrenchment theory. Current CIL-formation and exit doctrine 
is similarly consistent with symmetrical entrenchment theory. As 
previously discussed, states cannot typically unilaterally bind themselves to 
CIL, nor can they unilaterally unbind themselves. Gulati and Bradley’s 
proposal, however, would be inconsistent with symmetrical entrenchment 
theory. Rather than focus on the substantive overlap of treaty law and CIL, 
Withdrawing would have done well to observe the deeper procedural 
symmetric entrenchment similarity between these and many other kinds of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Gulati and Bradley have provided us with a creative and unusual 
proposal. They have stated that their article is written “primarily for 
scholars and students of international law.”59 With luck, it will enliven 
discussion and debate regarding legitimate disintegration of CIL and law 
more generally. But what is good for academic discussion and theory is not 
 
 57. JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, 819 
n.1-2 (6th ed. 2003) (citing Smith & Smith Bldg. Corp. v. DeLuca, 654 A.2d 368 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) 
and Kirk v. Brentwood Manor Homes, 159 A.2d 48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)). 
 58. See generally Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1 (noting that it is not obvious why it should be 
easier to exit treaties than CIL, especially given the significant overlap that exists today between the 
regulatory coverage of treaties and CIL, as well as the frequent use of treaties as evidence of CIL). 
 59. Id. at 275. 
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always supported in existing law and theory, nor is it necessarily 
normatively desirable.60 The critiques of Withdrawing discussed here and 
in other contributions to this symposium clearly demonstrate this truth. 
 
 60. Thanks to Anthea Roberts’s comments regarding this distinction. 
